Latin America 2026 Outlook – The Good, the Bad and the Ugly 

Turn Latin America’s 2026 outlook into a sharper strategy

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The Great

Guyana

Guyana’s 2026 story is no longer “oil is coming.” It’s “oil is here—and the real constraint is national execution.” The country’s fiscal stance is being set explicitly to convert oil-linked inflows into visible, non-oil capacity: roads, housing, health, and public administration. In the official 2026 Budget Speech (Ministry of Finance), the government frames the year as a scaling moment for delivery systems, not just spending lines.

The political center of gravity remains President Irfaan Ali and the governing PPP/C’s commitment to a “build-out” agenda. In domestic coverage around the budget, Ali has swatted back criticism that Guyana’s performance is superficial or purely state-driven, calling that critique “comical.” And yet, private FDI this year will be negative as massive investment bets made over the last six years now generate enormous profit repatriation.

Guyana’s oil trajectory anchors U.S. strategic attention: China’s presence is material through the upstream consortium (CNOOC stake) and broader contracting, but the dominant geopolitical fact is that U.S. policy covets stability around this new Atlantic oil basin. Exxon’s multi-project development pipeline is the country’s economic metronome: Yellowtail started in 2025 (250k bpd) and Uaru is expected to start in 2026, expanding capacity and enabling downstream gas/power industrialization ambitions.

We invented the Great classification to accommodate Guyana’s off-the-charts score in our Good, Bad, Ugly (GBU) index. But it is worth noting the Guyana’s score fell 38% from 2024 and may fall further to earth as its growth projections slow from electrifying to fast.

The Good

Chile

José Antonio Kast won the December 2025 runoff election and is due to take office on 11 March 2026. That transition matters because investors don’t price “left vs. right” in Chile so much as predictability, permitting speed, and security outcomes. Kast’s mandate is built on a promise to restore order and unlock growth, but he inherits a congress without an automatic majority—meaning policy ambition must confront legislative arithmetic.

The Banco Central de Chile has been signaling a 2026 growth band closer to “steady recovery” than boom, and—critically for investors—Chile’s policy transparency remains a comparative advantage (clear communications, scheduled reporting, and a credible inflation framework). Moderate real growth will none-the-less translate into impressive nominal USD GDP growth thanks to Chilean peso that is destined to appreciate on the back of rising metal prices, returning capital and investor confidence.

Despite the political pivot to the right, Chile will strive to keep relations positive with both the US and China. Chile is structurally close to the U.S. in capital markets and mining services, but China is the dominant marginal buyer for minerals and a key stakeholder via lithium and mining supply chains.

Chile is Good because institutions still anchor the cycle—even in a political reset. Chile’s score has improved 27% since 2024 thanks to a more promising political/investment climate ahead and very favorable metal price trends.

Paraguay

Paraguay is the region’s quiet outperformer in 2026, rising 35% on its GBU score since 2024, because it offers something scarce: high growth with macro and policy predictability. The Banco Central del Paraguay (BCP) projects real GDP growth of 6.0% in 2025 and 4.2% in 2026, with inflation converging gradually toward the 3.5% target in 2026.

Paraguay’s business climate advantage is institutional continuity and the credibility dividend from achieving broader market access. Its “political risk” is less electoral shock and more whether discipline holds (fiscal, anti-corruption, institution-building).

Paraguay is strategically pivotal because it remains a Taiwan-recognizer, making it a target of PRC diplomatic pressure and a point of U.S. interest in regional alignment. President Santiago Peña has rather effectively cozied up to US President Trump and Secretary of State Rubio.

Guatemala

Guatemala’s 2026 economic status is a classic “macro stability, micro constraints” story. Domestic commentary for 2026 repeatedly points to an official growth figure of around 4.1%, supported by remittances, household demand, and services exports. This is the “good news.” The “Guatemala constraint” remains institutional friction: project permitting, security costs, and uneven rule enforcement.

The political variable with the biggest commercial consequence remains whether the government can improve governance capacity without triggering elite pushback or legal instability. President Arevalo’s deft rapprochement with Washington helps keep his right-wing domestic opponents at bay.

Net: Good in 2026, 10% above its 2024 GBU score, because the macro floor looks firm, but strategic investment returns depend heavily on local operating capability.

Costa Rica

The business climate is being reset by the decisive election of Laura Fernández, who won the presidency in the first round (c. 48% of votes) and her Sovereign People’s Party is projected to hold an unusually strong legislative position (a rarity since 1990). That reduces “gridlock risk,” but raises a different risk: how far the new government tests institutional limits in the name of security and constitutional change.

Fernández has framed her win as the beginning of a new political era—Reuters reports her declaring the start of a “third republic.” (an ominous sounding title to any with an ear for history). Investor sentiment in 2026 will follow two variables: (1) whether public security actions reduce crime without eroding rule-of-law, and (2) whether the pro-business narrative is matched by clean, predictable execution.

On the economy, the Banco Central de Costa Rica projects moderation after a strong 2025: “En el 2026 el crecimiento sería moderado (3,8%),” according to its January 2026 Monetary Policy Report. This is still a strong figure relative to the region. Nearshoring services, medical devices, and high-value exports remain the structural drivers, even if certain, mostly lower-value, FDI projects rotate out.

Net: Good—with a rule-of-law “watchlist” embedded in the evaluation. The added political risk has brought down Costa Rica’s GBU score slightly by 5% since 2024.  

Peru

Peru is the region’s clearest example of “politics as a recurring operating cost.” José María Balcázar was recently chosen as the interim president (the 9^th in 10 years), tasked with overseeing elections scheduled for April 12, 2026 (runoff expected in June). This political instability raises the hurdle rate for greenfield projects and pushes investors toward brownfield/shorter-cycle bets.

Despite the political turmoil that has spanned a decade, Peru’s currency is the most stable in the region, thanks to several economic anchors: an over-sized mining sector that generates massive dollar income (especially now with record gold and copper prices), arguably the hemisphere’s best managed central bank, led by Julio Velarde (BCRP governor), a Fujimori shrunken government, and correspondingly limited tax burdens.

Peru’s problem is rarely macro capability; it’s governance continuity. Mining and infrastructure remain world-class opportunities, but investors price in delays: permitting, community conflict, and shifting political signals. In 2026, the election environment amplifies those risks, because candidates often campaign against “extractivism” even when budgets depend on it.

Despite the political noise, Peru’s economic growth prospects are strong in the short-term. As a result, Peru has climbed 14% in our GBU index since 2024.

Colombia

2026 is election-saturated: Congress elections (March 8) and the subsequent presidential cycle turn policymaking into campaign signaling. Even if institutions function, uncertainty delays long-cycle capex—especially in energy and regulated sectors.

With President Gustavo Petro shaping the narrative and opposition attempting a reset, the market’s baseline in 2026 is “wait and price.” Investors delay irreversible bets, especially in energy and long-cycle infrastructure, until post-election clarity emerges.

Under Petro, Colombia deepened its China engagement, including a Belt & Road cooperation plan—moves that raise U.S. concern and increase scrutiny for sensitive sectors (telecom, infrastructure, ports).

Colombia still has structural strengths: scale, diversified industry, and a sophisticated corporate ecosystem. But in 2026, risk premia are driven by (1) security trends in certain corridors, (2) regulatory signals around energy, and (3) fiscal flexibility.

Colombia has climbed 13% in its GBU score since 2024 thanks to favorable commodity prices, a lame-duck Presidency, hemmed in by strong institutions and the prospect of more sensible political leadership in the near future.

Brazil

2026 is a year of election gravity. Markets price the risk of fiscal loosening and policy noise, even if institutions are strong. Monetary policy is the second headline. The Banco Central do Brasil (Copom) held the Selic at 15.00% in its January 2026 meeting, and its official communications emphasize that inflation expectations for 2026 remain above target, and the external environment remains uncertain. Recent Reuters reporting indicates the central bank is signaling the start of a rate-cut cycle—while insisting policy will stay restrictive until inflation is anchored.

For investors, that’s the 2026 posture: easing may come, but Brazil is not returning to cheap money quickly. That restrains some domestic-demand sectors but supports disinflation credibility. It also keeps the Real strong and with it import growth.

The recent SCOTUS decision to strike down President Trump’s IEEPA tariffs (based upon a perceived national emergency) will bring some relief to Brazil’s trade balance and boost the Real even further.

Brazilian growth has proven resilient and the highest real interest rates in the world provide for strong import appetite, a boon for global exporters. Centrist congressional politics keep populism at bay. As a result, Brazil has climbed 17% in our GBU scoring since 2024.

Nicaragua

Nicaragua seems oddly placed as a “Good” country in our annual evaluation, but numbers do not lie, even if investor risk is real. The Banco Central de Nicaragua projects 2026 growth in a 3.5%–4.5% range and low unemployment. Foreign direct investment continues to grow thanks to the Ortega’s preferential treatment of the mining sector, which is buoyed by record high gold and silver prices. The government’s rapid approvals of mining permits and heavy-handed treatment of local mining opponents and unions has made Nicaragua an attractive place to operate for mining juniors. Mining majors stay away because of the reputational risk of getting too close to an abusive political autocrat.  

For the moment, Nicaragua has escaped the ideological wrath of US Secretary of State Marco Rubio who is busy trying to transform Venezuela and Cuba. Eventually, Nicaragua’s political pariah status will hurt its economic well-being, but that moment may not arrive in 2026 as record metal prices and continued remittance flows enrich consumers and boost imports. As a result, Nicaragua climbed 38% in its GBU score versus 2024.

Uruguay

Uruguay remains the region’s premium “low drama” market in 2026: stable institutions, predictable rule-of-law, and a central bank that communicates like a grown-up. The Banco Central del Uruguay notes that GDP growth projections were “stable for 2026”, even as other years see mild revisions. That’s exactly what investors pay for: fewer surprises. Improving export prospects in Argentina and Brazil help raise Uruguay’s GBU score by 8% vis-à-vis 2024.

Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic remains the Caribbean’s “big, small market” that investors can underwrite with fewer heroic assumptions. The Banco Central de la República Dominicana has laid out a clear 2026 baseline: growth “en torno a 4.0% para 2026,” supported by public and private investment and resilient services. That’s the right kind of growth: not a one-off sugar high, but a continuation of a broad services/tourism platform with manufacturing and logistics upside.

The political calendar is part of the appeal: 2026 is not a presidential cliff year, so the question is execution—airport/port capacity, electricity reliability, and workforce skills—rather than sudden regime change. For strategic investors, macro stability has always been the country’s appeal while project execution challenges (red tape, corruption, labor productivity & quality, and infrastructure bottlenecks) have handicapped returns. Changing those structural weaknesses has been a focus of the Abinader government but such transformation requires a generation, not a half decade. That reality takes some of the sheen off of the GBU score for the DR, which declined 8% since 2024.

The DR’s U.S. relationship (tourism flows, remittances, trade and finance) is the central macro stabilizer. China has a growing diplomatic/economic profile, but the U.S. is still the dominant commercial center of gravity.

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The Bad

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Mexico

In 2018, on the eve of AMLO’s Presidential election victory, AMI published an article titled, “Who’s afraid of AMLO?”, which predicted that Mexico’s robust institutions would restrain the populist instincts of its iconic new President. We were wrong. AMLO succeeded in undermining many of Mexico’s most important institutions including its electoral commission, many of its regulators, legislative plurality, the armed forces, and the judiciary. The political and economic costs of AMLO’s ‘make Mexico great again’ adventures now sit in President Sheinbaum’s inbox. Organized crime has strengthened its grip on large swaths of the country. Domestic investment growth, both private and public is anemic. Its energy sector remains unreformed and inefficient, just when data center growth requires robust capacity expansion. Mexico’s highly competitive export economy remains in limbo while Washington contemplates the future of its bi-lateral trade relations in a contentious mid-term election year.

Mexico, however, remains a profitable market for many foreign investors and global exporters thanks to the ‘super Peso’, kept strong by Mexico’s high real interest rates, directed by a hawkish central Bank. The most concrete 2026 signal came last week: Banxico paused and held the policy rate at 7.00% in pursuit of a 3% inflation target.

What’s investable in 2026 for Mexico: Industrial parks, logistics, automotive/EV supply chain, electronics, and services around cross-border manufacturing.

 
Key 2026 investment risks for Mexico: Security in key corridors, infrastructure bottlenecks (power/water), and U.S. trade enforcement pressure.

Mexico’s GBU score is largely unchanged since 2024. Improving Mexico’s investment climate requires painful changes: a renewed or long-lasting new trade agreement with Washington, genuine energy reform and investment, a purge of the Morena party’s worst elements (who are suspected of collaboration with organized crime), a re-examination of AMLO’s disastrous judicial reform, and the rebuild of several regulatory bodies which were gutted by AMLO. Don’t hold your breath.

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Argentina

Most investors applaud the direction that Argentina is taking under Milei. By 2027, we expect the country to climb to the Good levels of our index. For now, we can celebrate the countries rise from Ugly to Bad, an impressive scoring jump of 174%.

When assessing Argentina in 2026, one has to distinguish the opportunities presented to investors versus global exporters. Argentina’s RIGI program incentivizes large scale investment in sectors with long ROI timeframes like infrastructure. The program is lauded for attracting close to $25bn USD in new investment since 2024. Furthermore, Argentina’s dollar generating sectors like energy, mining, and agrifood also provide high risk-adjusted returns for investors. Where investors remain wary of are peso-generating projects that rely solely on domestic demand. Those intending to export to Argentina will find 2026 a moderate opportunity because the main street economy in Argentina still needs time to foster job creation and higher wages to the point that disposable incomes grow and consumption booms. That phase of economic rebound still needs time to foment.

What’s investable in 2026 for Argentina: Investors’ clearest growth bets are in energy (Vaca Muerta-related), mining (lithium/copper), and export infrastructure, where hard-currency revenues can outrun local macro noise.

Key 2026 investment risks for Argentina: Even with better macro discipline, Argentina can still be hit by credibility tests—FX pressures, regulatory reversals, labor unrest, or political fragmentation. This is why the same country can look like a generational opportunity and a trap within the same quarter.

Net score: Bad—not because Argentina can’t rebound, but because the distribution of outcomes remains wide, and old weaknesses can still haunt.

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Panama

Panama is still Panama in 2026: a services/logistics platform that monetizes geography—but with climate and trade volatility now a first-order variable. The Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas has pushed a bullish message: Panama “se consolida entre las economías de mayor crecimiento del hemisferio.”

Panama’s historically well-run canal remains the nation’s greatest economic asset. For investors, the question is how capacity allocation, pricing, and canal reliability evolve—and how quickly the private sector builds redundancy in ports, warehousing, and logistics. This is where Panama’s ecosystem wins: it adapts faster than most.

Panama is now a front-line theater for U.S.–China influence competition, specifically centered on canal-adjacent logistics. The ports dispute and related global transaction drama underscore how geopolitics can directly reshape concession outcomes and investor perceptions. The Mulino government is keen to prove to Washington that it is weaning itself from Chinese influence (without abandoning China as an economic partner). At the same time, there is a growing sentiment among business and political leaders in Panama, that it is time for the small nation to finance and direct its own strategic future and not rely on foreign monies and influence to decide its fate.

What’s investable in 2026 for Panama: Ports, logistics tech, trade finance/compliance, warehousing, and “shovel-ready” infrastructure that reduces congestion.

Key 2026 investment risks for Panama: Climate events affecting canal throughput, global trade slowdowns, and reputational/compliance scrutiny that can raise transaction costs.

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Honduras

The recent election of Nasry “Tito” Asfura is yet another rejection of left-wing politics in Latin America. Asfura promises to restore Honduras’ tradition of pro-business, lean regulatory environment in the hopes of restoring investment. Asfura has also promised to revive the nation’s recognition of Taiwan, whom his predecessor eschewed in favor of the PRC and juicy investments.

Honduras is well-positioned to attract more light manufacturing that is emigrating from China and other parts of Asia. But Honduras needs more than hard working cheap labor to compete. The nation must invest in private infrastructure including better ports, air cargo capacity, reliable roads and far more electricity capacity.

What’s investable in 2026 in Honduras: Targeted manufacturing, agribusiness, construction, and projects tied to remittance-driven consumption—so long as security and logistics are actively managed.

Key 2026 investment risks for Honduras: Crime/security costs, climate events, and any U.S. slowdown that hits remittances or demand.

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Jamaica

Prime Minister Andrew Holness has undertaken the herculean task of weaning Jamaica off of debt, lowering public debt to below 70% of GDP, down from over 100% eight years ago. His consolidation efforts are laudable and will bear fruit over the long run for Jamaica’s debt burdened economy. However, the continued fiscal costs of debt reduction combined with the recovery efforts after 2025 hurricane Melissa combine to hurt domestic demand and limit the earnings potential of tourism in 2026.

This doesn’t mean Jamaica becomes “uninvestable.” It means that timing matters. Reconstruction spending and external financing can create pockets of opportunity—construction, logistics, resilient energy, and insurance-adjacent services—while consumer-facing discretionary sectors will likely soften.

What’s investable in 2026 in Jamaica: Partnering with the rebuild; resilient housing, grid hardening, and ports/roads that reduce future storm vulnerability.

Key 2026 investment risks for Jamaica: Fiscal strain, slower-than-expected disbursement of reconstruction funds, and tourism volatility if airlift or infrastructure is impaired. Jamaica has made credibility gains over time, but 2026 is the year when external shocks can re-open hard fiscal questions.

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El Salvador

In 2026, El Salvador continues to be a security-dividend story with a reputational discount. Such an environment is attractive for certain strategic investors while remains heavily discounted for regulated financial capital that is sensitive to rule-of-law perceptions (Country risk is priced at 8.4%). Since 2024, our scoring of El Salvador has risen a dramatic 36%, boosting El Salvador from an Ugly rating to a Bad rating.

Bukele’s draconian security measures and consolidation of power have largely benefitted the operational environment for businesses in El Salvador, particularly small and micro sized businesses which were vulnerable to extortion threats from gangs. But how long will Bukele’s form of authoritative power remain benevolent, unselfish and fair? How long before he feels compelled to cash in on the security dividend that his government created? And will his government and politicized legal system treat all investors fairly and equally or will nepotism, corruption and favoritism creep into executive decision making and court decisions? Long term investors will continue to eschew El Salvador as long as the rule of law remains compromised.

What’s investable in 2026 in El Salvador: Tourism expansion, commercial real estate in improving zones, select infrastructure, and consumer services.

Key 2026 investment risks for El Salvador: Governance concentration and reputational filtering that raises the cost of capital.

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Ecuador

Ecuador’s 2026 business climate is dominated by security and governance capacity. Even if GDP growth is positive, companies price extortion, logistics disruption, and enforcement uncertainty as an operating tax.

As the largest dollarized economy in the world outside of the USA, with over 2,000 km of coastline, and a similar land border length with Colombia and Peru (two of the world’s largest cocaine producers), Ecuador was destined to become a money laundromat for much of South America’s drug production. First inklings of this began showing up 15 years ago but the big reveal came in January 2024 when gangs stormed a central TV station, declaring their opposition to government actions taken against them. Now that the genie is out of the bottle, the Noboa administration has had to dedicate massive resources to fighting a giant problem, drowning out any remaining (mostly positive) narratives about Ecuador’s business environment.

When we last evaluated Ecuador, the January events were fresh on our minds but the full extent of their damage to the operability of Ecuador was not yet calculated. As a result, we score Ecuador 12% below where it stood two years ago.

What’s investable in 2026 in Ecuador: Mining, energy, and export logistics are all solid choices.

Key 2026 investment risks for Ecuador: The operating environment keeps adding hidden taxes: security spending, disruptions, and legal uncertainty. Ecuador’s upside depends heavily on whether the state sustains credible security improvements without undermining institutions or exhausting fiscal flexibility.

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The Ugly

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Trinidad & Tobago

Trinidad remains a reasonably well-governed economy compared to many of its neighbors. Its economic weaknesses are structural. Trinidad owes its wealth to its large natural gas deposits and downstream processing/manufacturing sectors, neither of which are competitive today.

Under Obama, US natural gas supply, expanded as it was by fracking, remained trapped inside the country, ostensibly due to environmental concerns but truthfully to placate the downstream chemical producers (Dow, Exxon, Methanex, CF Industries, etc.) who promised to and did build dozens of production plans inside the USA when unemployment hovered at 10% due to the 2009 financial crisis. The expansion of US ammonia, methane, and chemical supply subsequently threatened Trinidad’s downstream industries.

Trinidad’s gas export business was severely impacted by the approval of a number of natural gas export terminals on the US Gulf coast following the election of Trump 1.0 in 2016. US natural gas, some of the cheapest in the world flooded the market, stealing much of Trinidad’s international customer base. With offshore natural gas production growing in Guyana and likely to grow again in Venezuela and Colombia over the next few years, Trinidad will lose most of its remaining export markets. As a result, growth is muted, investment levels are anemic and our score for Trinidad & Tobago dropped 23% since 2024. 

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Venezuela

The extraction of Nicolas Maduro on January 3^rd, 2026, in a bold US military operation, has ignited both hope among Venezuelans as well as sparked a gold-rush fundraising effort that, by last count, exceeds over $12bn, held in multiple funds. Reviving Venezuela’s oil sector with US diplomatic help (to open customer doors in Gulf refineries as well as overseas customers like India), as well as technical assistance from US oil services companies, is the focus of initial investment efforts. But US, Spanish, Colombian and other firms are already making plans to sell more goods to Venezuela as purchasing power returns. Those initial reactions represent the glass-half-full approach to the new Venezuela.  

But let’s pinch ourselves for a moment and focus on opportunities in 2026. Venezuela remains a highly indebted nation with creditors and their lawyers circling like vultures, infrastructure from the oil sector to roads to bridges remains in a tattered state, most of the nation’s talented elite no longer live in Venezuela and the stewards of Venezuela’s sinking economy over the last quarter century remain in power.

Deploying risk-seeking investment capital will require due diligence, not only to protect capital owners but also to keep investors from legal exposure to US sanctions and laws designed to strangle the economy and the grip on it by Chavistas.

Venezuela’s economy will appreciate in value thanks to the appreciation of the bolivar, but the real economy will barely expand in a year dominated by investor tire kicking, not (yet) massive strategic investment and value creation. The Trump-Rubio strategy of reviving the economy before ensuring democracy must run its course at least one year before we see on-the-ground progress.

Hence our evaluation remains ugly. This is about a lack of bankability—poor contract enforceability, weak property rights, still existing and convoluted sanctions architecture, and who holds durable power. A major political signal is the regime’s push for an “amnistía” law framework in early February 2026—presented as reconciliation but criticized for its limits—showing that the transition remains politically tense. In short, Venezuela is a massive opportunity, but enforceability and political clarity are still the gating items in 2026.

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Bolivia

Bolivia’s 2026 is a transition year after a genuine political reset. Rodrigo Paz won the runoff in late 2025 and took office facing depleted reserves and a fractured Congress. The opportunity is real—policy re-rating, private investment frameworks, and a potential shift in global alignment—but 2026 is also the “pay the bill” year for adjustment.

Bolivia’s foreign reserves have all but evaporated, so the pegged Boliviano is at real risk of devaluation. Whether depreciation follows a structured path or a chaotic collapse depends upon external financing that Bolivia can negotiate. They are known to be in talks with the IMF and speculated to be in talks with Washington, in pursuit of a line of credit to buffer against any run on the currency by panicked investors. The specter of a currency collapse appears to be fading with each sensible policy move and pronouncement from the highly respected Paz administration.

If the MAS party is significantly weakened in nationwide municipal elections on March 22^nd, 2026, then the hydrocarbon and mining reforms that the Paz administration wants to enact will be implemented without too much political interference in the provinces and the nation’s prospects improve.

A year from now, Bolivia may well be a smaller economy, measured in USD, which means that imports will fall in 2026 before rebounding in 2027. Investors are keen to go (back) into Bolivia but will wait for execution on FX normalization, subsidy reform, some form of privatization or deregulation of the gas industry and a credible pathway for lithium governance that avoids the “deal risk” that has haunted prior attempts.

What’s investable in 2026 in Bolivia: Short-cycle consumer recovery plays (if FX stabilizes), mining services where contracts are enforceable, and “reform-enabling” sectors (payments, logistics, fuel supply chain).

Key 2016 investment risks for Bolivia: Social backlash to subsidy changes, Congress blocking reforms, and further FX stress.

Net: Ugly in 2026 because the direction may be positive, but stabilization is messy, politically costly, and timing-sensitive.

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John Price

John Price is the Managing Director of Americas Market Intelligence. With 20 years of experience in Latin American market intelligence consulting, John has supervised nearly 1,200 client engagements and advises clients in more than 20 countries across Latin America. John’s areas of focus for AMI Perspectiva include Latin America’s natural resources, logistics and industrial products industries.

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